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Airport Performance and Ownership Structure:








This study investigates the operational and financial efficiency of airports in selected countries using a cross-regional analysis. A total
factor productivity (TFP) approach is used to examine the operational and financial efficiencies of selected airports in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and several Latin American countries. The empirical results indicate mixed implications and suggest that the
privatized airports in the United Kingdom outperform the partially privatized, government-owned airports in Latin America; however, the
evidence also suggests that the selected United States airports outperform the other two groups for each year of this investigation (2000–
2010). The ambivalence of these results suggests that airport efficiency and productivity may be better evaluated in terms of market
structure and competition rather than on the basis of ownership.
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Introduction
Airport performance evaluation has become increasingly
important to airport managers due to air transport liberal-
ization, airline alliances, privatization, and global financial
necessities. Performance evaluation can be split between
operational efficiency and financial efficiency. Financial
measurements allow airport managers to plan for financial
resources and capital investment as efficiently as possible, an
extremely important function as today’s airport infrastruc-
tures are very expensive and take a long time to complete.
Operational or technical efficiency measurements may be
used as comparisons and guidelines in strategic planning.
Efficiency is a standard benchmark for economists and is
widely used by many policy analysts in evaluating the
outcome of privatization. Increasing passenger demand,
escalating cargo expansion, increasing operating costs, and
liability exposure have placed tremendous capital demands on
government and state airport owners. As a result, governments
recognize that private capital investment is needed to meet
airport expansion, while commercialized management is
needed to meet airports’ operating efficiency and customer
services. From the viewpoint of private investors and
operators, airports can be profitable investments which
operate as part of the vibrant transportation industry.
Today, many countries in Asia, Europe, and the Americas
have privatized airports. Countries that have completed the
sale or lease of airport facilities include: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Africa, and Switzerland. Presently, Japan is
considering privatizing 94 of its 136 airports (CAPA, 2012).
This plan, however, would exclude Japan’s four main
international airports: Narita, Kansai, Nagoya, and Haneda.
In Latin America, 90% of key airports are under partial or
full private control (Buyck, 2007). Brazil, the country with
the most airports in Latin America, successfully auctioned
off three of its largest airports for the sum of $14 billion early
in 2012. However, transfer of a government monopoly to a
private monopoly does not guarantee augmentation in
efficiency or productivity unless it is accompanied by
additional factors such as economic growth, increased airline
presence, or enhanced competition. This premise may
interpose with preconceptions that privately-operated air-
ports are more efficient than government operators—or more
simply—may reinforce the concept of major commercial
airports as natural monopolies.
Airport Privatization Techniques
Governments around the world encourage private parti-
cipation in management and operation of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) to enhance customer service, access
capital, improve service delivery time, and reduce fiscal
burden. Privatization is often encouraged as a means to
reduce the government’s role in economic activities; the
airport industry is no exception. Building a new airport or
adding a new runway requires large capital investments over
a long period, usually at least ten years.
There are various ways in which the transfer of airports from
public to private can occur, and each case is specific to the
needs of a particular airport. Private investors may participate
in airport ownership, management, and project investments.
Privatization can encompass a range of different models that
can be used to privatize airports, taking into consideration a
broad definition of the privatization practice. Hence, it is
imperative to choose a method in accordance with both
macroeconomic and microeconomic objectives.
Furthermore, there are a seemingly unlimited number of
ways in which to categorize how privatization takes place.
For instance, the World Bank Group uses the following
classification: (a) Greenfield, (b) concession, (c) manage-
ment and lease contract, and (d) divestiture. Myers (2006)
used the following categories: (a) Greenfield, (b) long-term
lease, (c) government corporation buy-out, (d) partial share
sale, and (e) privatization of services. In addition, Oum,
Adler, and Yu (2006) used six categories: (a) government
agency or department operating directly, (b) mixed private-
government ownership with a private majority, (c) mixed
government-private ownership with a government majority,
(d) government ownership to management authority under
long-term lease, (e) multilevel governments, and (f) 100%
government corporation ownership.
For this paper, the methods of privatization are broken
down as such: (a) no privatization, (b) contract management,
(c) hybrid public-private partnerships, (d) concessions: build-
operate-transfer (BOT) and build-own-operate (BOO), (e)
long-term leases, and (f) full and partial asset sales through
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). It is important to note that,
unlike Oum et al. (2006), in which categorization directly
affected the outcome of their analysis, the categories in this
paper are used more to determine the structure of the different
regions rather than their direct impact on the results. To this
effect, the analysis that follows is divided into three general
categories that span the majority of the privatization
spectrum: selected airports from the United States (the US
group) are comprised of methods (a), (b), and (c); the airports
from Latin American (the LA group) are comprised of
methods (a), (d), and (e); and lastly, the selected airports from
the United Kingdom (the UK group) are comprised of
methods from category (f). The authors will introduce these
methods of privatization in order of their degree of private
involvement, from least privatized to most privatized.
No Privatization
Before several of its largest airports were sold on leases,
the overwhelming majority of Brazil’s airports were under
the direct ownership and control of Infraero, a national
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public company linked to the country’s military and
defense department. Only recently, with the growth of its
economy coupled with the world showcases of the World
Cup and Olympics, Brazil’s airports became key candidates
for private involvement as a means of developing new
facilities and boosting passenger satisfaction. However, for
the time period covered in this study (2000–2010), the
selected airports from this country are considered as solely
public organizations. Similarly, many smaller airports in
Canada and the United States are operated under the budget
of the cities, counties, and municipalities in which they
reside. In many of these cases, the development and
operational costs of such large facilities are far too great for
any success as a private venture, and instead remain as
services in the public domain.
Airport Contract Management
Contract management can be considered the least
privatized form of airport ownership and involves certain
parts of the airport being contracted out to private
companies (such as restaurants, parking facilities, baggage
handling, cargo, security, fueling, and basic maintenance).
This type of agreement usually does not carry a large
investment commitment and by far is the most common
form of privatization. Under this method, the government
still holds management and operational control of the
airport. In most cases, airports will use this type of
privatization in order to reduce costs and increase revenues.
Similarly, in some instances, governments may grant
contracts for larger operations, such as an entire terminal
or even overall management of the airport to the private
sector.
Hybrid Public-Private Partnership
In some countries, especially in the United States, there
are certain public-private agreements that cannot appro-
priately be placed into the other categories mentioned in
this paper. In these contracts, concessions, and longer term
leases, the government entity responsible for airport
operations will hire a private firm to complete a project
to develop or modernize facilities. However, in the US,
where individual airlines often have significant control over
terminals and general airport operations, projects such as
terminal renovation take on a hybrid form of a public-
private partnership.
Prime examples of the Hybrid Public-Private Partnership
are the terminals at JFK International Airport in New York.
Terminal 1 was renovated and reopened in 1998 by a
partnership (Terminal One Group) of Air France, Japan
Airlines, Korean Air, and Lufthansa at a cost of $435
million. JFK’s Terminal 4, which was overhauled in 2001
by JFK IAT LLC, is under a two-phase expansion and
renovation project, Phase 1 of which was completed on
May 24, 2013, and Phase 2, which began in June 2013, and
it is scheduled for operation in 2015 (JFK IAT, 2013).
Airlines investing in airport infrastructure can also be seen
in other places in the United States, especially in fuel
distribution. The LAX Fuel Corporation is a consortium of
airlines that contracts fuel distribution to a third party
(Aircraft Service International Group [ASIG]) outside the
direct control of the airport.
A slightly different partnership encompasses Orlando
Sanford International Airport and Bob Hope Airport in
Burbank, California. Both airports are owned by local
governments that have contracted management of the
airport to TBI Airport Management, Inc. At Orlando
Sanford, TBI manages both international and domestic
terminals and is responsible to develop additional air
service and provide ground handling and cargo services
(Orlando Sanford Airport, 2012). However, the Sanford
Airport Authority is still responsible for all air-side
activities, as well as the properties surrounding the airfield.
TBI also operates several other airports, including three
airports in Bolivia. Abertis Infraestructuras, a Spanish
corporation, owns a 90% stake in TBI via a holding
company and manages toll roads and communication
infrastructure as well as airports. The remaining 10% stake
is owned by Aena Internacional, a Spanish government-
owned airport operator (Abertis, 2012).
Build-Operate-Transfer and Build-Own-Operate
Concession agreements are very common practices of
governments securing private involvement in development
projects under a competitive bidding process. These
concessions are a specific type of contract that usually
lasts from 15–30 years, depending on the nature of the
project. As such, they are considered to have a higher
degree of privatization than generic contract management,
but are considered less so than longer term lease
arrangements.
Under the build-operate-transfer (BOT) method, a
private investor will build and operate a government-
owned airport and gain revenue from the operation. Then,
after a certain period, the operator transfers the ownership
of the facility back to the government. This is used in order
to create enough revenue to build large infrastructures.
For example, the Chilean government is retendering
the concession at La Serna airport in northern Chile. The
current contract ends in 2013 and the government is
currently looking for new bidders on an $8 million
investment to remodel the terminal building (Uphoff,
2012). Terminal 3 in Lester B. Pearson Airport in
Toronto, Canada was built as a Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT) agreement between the government-
owned Transport Canada and Lockheed Air Terminal of
Canada, Inc. (Juan, 1996). The terminal was built in 1991
for $570 million under a 60-year land lease, but the contract
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was broken in 1997 and the terminal was purchased by the
government (Bryden, 1997).
Concession agreements are very safe ways of moving the
risks of project development from the public sector to the
private sector. This approach is mainly used when airport
capacity needs to be expanded. It has the characteristics of a
long-term franchise for infrastructure facilities under which
projects are built, operated, and eventually transferred to the
government in contractual agreements with private sectors
parties. Private consortia are often able to design and build
large facilities in less time than is possible through traditional
government procurement methods. In 2005, a consortium
headed by Hochtief Airport won a 20-year concession at
Tirana Airport in Albania. The consortium was comprised of
Hochtief (47%), the Albanian American Enterprise Fund
(21.3%), and a German investment corporation, DEG
(31.7%) (Turner, 2004). In addition, the up-front and
operating costs can be lowered to generate long-term
profitability.
Developments of entirely new airports under BOT
schemes are uncommon in comparison to smaller conces-
sion projects. Nonetheless, the new Athens International
Airport was completed in 2001 under a BOT agreement
between the Greek government and a consortium headed
by Hochtief AirPort for the duration of 25 years. The new
Berlin-Brandenburg Airport was planned to be built under
a BOT agreement to be finished in 2012; however, after
several delays, the airport is now scheduled to begin
operations in October of 2016. These delays have forced
airlines to reroute previously scheduled flights and initial
private contracts have been terminated (Gubisch, 2012).
Under the Build-Own-Operate method, the private entity
remains the owner of the project for the lifetime of the
project.
Long-Term Lease
The long-term lease option turns over a large portion of
the airport to private investors. Typically, the lease
payment is paid to the government on a percentage of the
gross revenue, and therefore creates an incentive to
minimize costs. The long-term lease agreement is used
when the facility under contract requires substantial new
development. The goal of the government is to transfer
investment and risk away from the government to a private
lessee. Fees and airport usage charges are directly paid to
the lessee, whereas the government receives a percentage of
the gross revenues. Long-term leases are similar to conces-
sion agreements, but the substantial differences in size and
scope allocate for a higher degree of private involvement.
Australia has successfully used this method in the privatiza-
tion of their major airports by first consolidating its airports
into a government corporation and then privatizing in phases
through lease agreements. In 1997, the Australian govern-
ment raised more than $2.6 billion through the sale of
Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth airports (TTF Australia,
2007). It followed this trend in 2002 with the sale of Sydney
Airport to the Southern Cross consortium for US $3.2 billion
(Ionides, 2002).
Full and Partial Asset Sale
The next most widely used method and the highest level of
private involvement is one in which the private company
owns the entire equity of the airport, including its terminals
and other facilities, operates the airport, and invests in capital
expenditures. Governments offer the airport at an auction to
which the highest bidder will receive either a portion or the
entire airport ownership. In this type, the earnings from the
sale usually go to reducing outstanding government debts or
for other investment projects. Governments usually sell when
they believe the airport is more efficiently operated by the
private sector, or the government is experiencing economic
loss from operating the airport. The government of New
Zealand had this in mind when it created Auckland
International Airport Limited and gradually divested its shares
to the private sector and local governments since 1998 (ICAO,
2011). Since that time, many airports in Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Africa, Switzerland, and Venezuela have been fully or partially
privatized in a similar manner.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are based on the first-time
offering of shares to public investors. The most widely
known IPO transaction took place in 1987 when Prime
Minister Thatcher proposed to sell off the British Airports
Authority. Some governments prefer to retain a minority or
majority vote in the airport. In this case, airports will sell
partial interests. As of 2006, the Beijing International
Airport Co. Ltd. listed 1.5 billion shares as ‘‘H shares’’ and
800 million shares as ‘‘A shares’’, while 2.5 billion shares
(51%) were kept under ownership of the government-
owned company (BCIA, 2012). Similarly, the government
of Thailand listed its airports on the national stock
exchange through a partial privatization (30%) to raise
cash to help finance Bangkok’s new airport (Fullbrook,
2002).
Literature Review
While over 100 airports around the world are either
privatized or are in the process of being transferred to
private enterprises, the privatization of airports has received
mixed reviews. Proponents argue that the benefits of airport
privatization include efficiency gains through the transfer
of ownership and management of public airports to private
owners and managers (Poole, 1997). Privatization con-
tributes to the improvement of airport amenities and
enhances financial efficiencies in the form of increased
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revenues and profits. In contrast, those opposed to
privatizing airports state that the airport industry is a
natural monopoly, and therefore should be regulated by the
government. In addition, there are concerns that privatiza-
tion of an airport will take away the profit from the airport
without reinvesting it back into airport infrastructure. Those
against privatization argue that government ownership may
have several potential advantages over private ownership,
the most important being the pursuit of socially desirable
objectives. These may include higher employment level,
production of socially desirable products, and public goods.
In a 2003 study, Vasigh and Haririan could not support
superiority of private airports over public airports. How-
ever, other studies such as Oum, Yu, and Fu (2003) and
Oum, Zhang, and Zhang (2004) indicate that the airports
owned by mixed enterprises with a private sector majority
ownership are more efficient than airports owned by
government branches or a 100% public corporation.
Despite dozens of studies evaluating the productivity of
airports and many more focusing on ownership and
privatization, only a few have addressed the relative
productivity of private versus public airports in terms of
both operational and financial efficiencies.
In a study by Vasigh and Hamzaee (1998), it was
concluded that privatization can only be accepted or
rejected on the basis of theory, politics, or ideology.
Another study by Vasigh and Haririan (2003) investigated
the financial and operational efficiency of private versus
public airports by using fifteen airports (both public and
private) chosen by their similarity in hub size. These results
showed that there is a statistically significant difference
between the two types of ownership. Public enterprises
were shown to have better financial efficiency in this
aspect. For privatized airports, the cost per runway was
lower than that for public airports; alternatively, the
passengers per runway was higher for public airports than
private airports.
A study by Vasigh and Gorjidooz (2006) tested
productivity in public and private airports using 22 US
and EU airports over five years. They concluded that the
productivity and efficiency depend on market power,
regulatory control, and the level of competition in the
environment in which they operate.
In the book, The Official History of Privatisation (2012),
author David Parker discusses price cap regulation in
the form of retail prices index, which is at a basic
level considered at RPI minus one based on yield and
consistency with the single till approach. The cap limits the
maximum allowable revenue yield per passenger that can
be levied by way of airport charges.
There are a number of techniques that have been applied
to measure airport efficiencies, including ratio analysis,
regression analysis, data envelopment analysis (DEA), and
total factor productivity. Gillen and Lall (1997) adopted a
data envelopment analysis and a Tobit Model to measure
and rank the productivity of 21 top US airports, using data
from 1989–1993. Sarkis (2000) used DEA to measure 44
US airports from 1990–1994, and Martin and Roman
(2001) applied the DEA method to analyze the technical
efficiency and performance of several Spanish airports. A
major attractiveness of DEA is its ability to handle multiple
inputs and outputs to derive relative efficiencies.
Hooper and Hensher (1997) used a nonparametric index
number method to test the productivity of six Australian
airports over four fiscal years, 1989–1991. This study also
included an investigation to apply the concepts of total
factor productivity specifically to the airport sector.
Following the Federal Airports Corporation Act in 1986,
Abbott and Wu (2002) applied both TFP and DEA to
Australian airports in the 1990s to study productivity
growth. Oum et al. (2003) analyzed 50 major airports using
TFP regression models that suggested that ownership
structure does not have a strong effect on productivity
and performance. In another study, Yoshida (2004)
expanded the investigation on the application of TFP in
an analysis of 30 airports in Japan for the year 2000, using
terminal size and total runway length as input variables,
and cargo, passenger handling volumes, and aircraft
movements as output variables.
The traditional TFP model was developed by Caves et al.
(1982) and applied by Hooper and Hensher (1997) to the
airport sector. This translog multilateral productivity index
is weighted using revenue and cost shares of respective
output and input variables. However, as pointed out in a
study by Oum et al. (2003), a major obstacle in employing
the traditional TFP model is a lack of transparent financial
data of airport operators that would allow output and input
variables to be matched with their appropriate revenue or
cost shares. As a result, both Oum et al. (2003) and
Yoshida (2004) applied what has been termed as the
‘‘Endogenous-Weighted’’ system to the TFP ratio index as
a means of benchmarking the technical efficiency of
airports in their research. This ‘‘EW-TFP’’ method does not
need revenue or price data, but still requires the same
sensitivity that the DEA method provides.
Method
The authors divided selected airports into three very
different and distinctive groups: the United States group,
the United Kingdom group, and the Latin American group.
The UK group is composed of six airports, while the US
and Latin American groups are composed of nine and
eleven airports, respectively (see Table 1). In the United
States, all major commercial airports have been tradition-
ally independent of national control, being owned and
operated by municipalities or regional authorities and
influenced by private interests, such as airlines and general
aviation. As a result, US airports are considered to be fully
public airports controlled by various local government
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agencies. In contrast, the UK group represents fully
privatized airports, while the Latin American group is
composed of a mix of government-owned and privately-
operated airports selected by countries throughout Latin
America, including Mexico. The major source of data for the
airports in these groups was acquired by the authors utilizing
the ICAO Database and Flightglobal. For US airports,
financial information was provided via FAA Report 127. UK
airport information was taken from the yearly Airports
Statistics, which includes the UK Airports Industry
Statistical Series published by the University of Bath.
The authors also wish to make mention of the potential
effects that airport size has on efficiency calculations used
in this study. For instance, by looking at annual passenger
averages, the selected Latin American airports have an
average of 7,671,636 passengers compared to 24,479,500
for the UK and 54,369,222 for the selected US airports.
While selecting different airports will surely yield different
results, it does pose the question of the true impact of
comparing airports with such diverse characteristics and the
role of economies of scale in such an analysis. Furthermore,
when interpreting the data and results, it is important to
remember that nonprofit and for-profit organizations are
being compared with the same standards, although they
have different functional and managerial objectives.
Productivity Analysis
In order to evaluate performance of airport operations, the
role of productivity and its measurement become important
for both public and private entities. As mentioned earlier,
there are a number of techniques that have been adopted and
applied to measure airport productivity, including single
ratio analysis, multivariate ratio indexing, total factor pro-
ductivity, Data Envelopment Analysis, and Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA). Productivity is defined as the ratio
of the outputs to inputs, and for this study, is divided into two
separate components: technical (operational) efficiency and
financial efficiency. This section describes the nonpara-
metric methods used in this paper to determine the results of
our observation.
Technical (operational) efficiency
In this paper, the authors utilize the multilateral TFP
index introduced by Caves et al. (1982), expanded by
Hooper and Hensher (1997), and utilized by Oum et al.
Table 1
Selected airports by group.












HEATHROW LHR 69,391.40 476.2 2,944.73 2,161.96 3,875,184
GATWICK LGW 33,674.26 251.07 707.73 565.23 2,855,512
STANSTED STN 18,042.40 136.9 348.29 289.75 1,500,000
EDINBURGH EDI 9,384.70 105.8 140.78 105.72 1,863,642
GLASGOW INTL GLA 6,864.00 70.5 203.9 86.53 546,922
SOUTHAMPTON SOU 1,762.50 45.7 74.47 70.28 684,013
Latin American Group
GUARULHOS INTL GRU 30,003.43 270.6 489.97 231.66 3,253,484
RIO DE JANEIRO INTL GIG 14,952.83 139.44 323.95 205.19 3,548,886
CANCUN INTL CUN 13,112.00 121 263.25 139.04 2,262,151
LUIS R MAGALHAES SSA 8,394.90 125.98 78.07 45.64 2,196,912
SALGADO FILHO POA 7,834.31 99.58 90.35 56.98 1,047,340
MIGUEL HIDALGO GDL 7,225.00 129.98 127.88 65.83 3,145,847
GUARARAPES INTL REC 6,383.37 83.64 79.05 55.09 3,253,484
GRAL. MARIANO ESCOBEDO MTY 5,642.00 86 89.54 78.05 2,035,846
MARISCAL SUCRE UIO 5,547.00 82 148.97 67.79 1,545,636
GEN. RODRIGUEZ TIJ 3,534.00 42.47 54.26 40.68 1,398,384
JUAN SANTAMARIA INTL SJO 3,420.00 64 22.93 11.31 1,492,031
United States Group
HARTSFIELD ATL 92,389.02 924 411.21 203.38 7,333,500
O’HARE INTL ORD 66,659.71 878.8 679.4 609.5 9,153,650
LOS ANGELES INTL LAX 61,862.05 702.9 855.5 747.73 6,914,350
DALLAS-FT. WORTH DFW 57,744.55 646.8 514.6 611.47 15,324,610
DENVER DEN 52,849.13 628.8 602.77 571.93 16,400,000
JOHN F. KENNEDY INTL JFK 47,683.53 411.23 1,068.76 903.23 7,068,450
GEORGE BUSH INTERCONTL IAH 40,128.95 517.26 410.4 447.36 7,560,300
ORLANDO INTL MCO 35,426.01 309.88 358.38 320.53 7,651,800
LA GUARDIA LGA 24,122.48 366.6 334.14 288.48 2,100,000
Sources: 2010 Financial Reports of Airports, Flightglobal, and ICAO Data.
B. Vasigh, G. Erfani, & B. W. Sherman / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 45
(2003) and Yoshida (2004) in order to estimate the
technical efficiency of the selected airports. This model is
based on the Cobb-Douglas production function and the
assumption that the production process exhibits constant
returns to scale and is used to represent the relationship of
an output to inputs. If technological knowledge in all
airports is more or less the same, then one can assume that
productivity in all such airports will be the same. This
means that the same quantities of output would be
produced by given quantities of inputs such as runway,
gates, and labor. Of course, this hypothetical relationship
has been challenged by many empirical works, such as
Trefler’s (1993) macroeconomic applications. One of the
best explanations of the TFP method is arguably that which
Harrigan (1997) has offered in his theoretical and empirical
cross-country comparisons of industry TFP.
However, whereas the traditional TFP model uses
revenue and cost shares as weights for each variable, the
following technical efficiency evaluation utilizes the
‘‘Endogenous-Weighted’’ system developed by Oum et al.
(2003) and Yoshida (2004). Under this system, greater
emphasis is placed on those variables which show the least
variation (or standard deviation) amongst themselves in each
year of the data set. This EW-TFP is used to create a
productivity index based upon the ratio of the products of
selected outputs with the products of selected inputs. The
multilateral TFP index formula used by Hooper and Hensher
(1997) was modified by Yoshida (2004). This modified
formula replaces revenue and cost-based weights with an
‘‘endogenous’’ weighting system that places emphasis on
those variables which show lower variation (or standard
deviation) each year while still maintaining the constant
returns to scale assumption. Total factor productivity ratios,
or technical efficiency ratings, can be measured using the
translog multilateral productivity index developed by Caves





































TFPk is the technical efficiency rating of the k-th airport
TFPb is the technical efficiency rating of the base airport
k is the number of individual airport observation, k 5 1,
…, K
b is the base observation (selected airport)
j is the number of outputs, j 5 1, …, J
i is the number of inputs, i 5 1, …, I
Rj is the weight for each output
Rj is the geometric mean of output weights over all
observations
Si is the weight for each input
Si is the geometric mean of input weights over all
observations
ln Qj is the unit measure of output
ln QJ is the geometric mean of output weights over all
observations
ln Ii is the unit measure of input
ln II is the geometric mean of input weights over all
observations
In this study the following inputs and outputs are used in
the analysis:
Outputs (Q):
N Number of passengers
N Number of aircraft movements
N Freight (metric tons)
N Average aircraft size (in terms of passengers)
Inputs (I):
N Terminal space (square feet)
N Number of gates (Remote gates and hardstands
included)
N Runway Area (square feet)
Financial efficiency
If there was complete dissemination of financial
information for the selected airports, these figures could
be substituted into the TFP analysis to be used as price
weights for appropriate variables. However, as only
aggregate information is available for all the selected
airports, the financial efficiency must be examined
separately as combining the financial aggregates with the
technical efficiency model would require very loose
assumptions and approximations. As such, for this section
of the analysis, a total revenue/total expense ratio is
calculated and indexed so each airport and airport group
can be compared side-by-side on a financial basis, and then
cross-compared with the technical efficiency index.
It should be noted that a substantial portion of US airports’
total revenues are a result of government grants, which are
accounted for under nonoperating revenue and thus boost an
airport’s total revenue, perhaps artificially, and may create an
overestimation of the airport’s actual revenue. However, two
factors overcome this limitation. First, because the FAA
limits the passenger facility charge that any US airport can
levy, one can defend that airport revenues are artificially
lowered by this price ceiling, and any received government
grants merely replace this lost revenue. Secondly, one core
argument in favor of privatization is the ease of acquiring
capital for the airport’s projects, and thus the inclusion of
nonoperating income in the total revenue aggregate creates
an additional basis for comparison.
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Technical efficiency index
The technical efficiency index results obtained from the
EW-TFP model for the selected airport groups are
displayed in Figure 1.
The drop in productivity in the US group in 2001 may be
due to the events of September 11th (9/11) and its resulting
aftermath. Post 9/11, many airlines and airports experi-
enced a long period of decreasing demand which was
beyond the control of airport managers. Based on our
analysis, the US airports are the most technically efficient
group in our sample analysis. Both UK and US groups
outperform the LA group; however, the evidence suggests
that the airports within the LA group have steadily
increased their efficiency while the others have declined
over the last decade. Economic and air transport growth,
experimentation in privatization practices, and an increase
in professional know-how may all help explain this trend.
Financial efficiency index
The financial efficiency index results are shown in
Figure 2. Although the group rankings are generally the
same, there is much greater variability in the financial index
than in the operational index. This can be explained from
large, one-time nonrevenue gains and expenditures for
facility development and expansion, even though annual
upkeep and operations remain more stable.
Comparing the two indices, the results show a weak but
positive connection between technical efficiency (productivity)
and financial efficiency (profitability) with a correlation
coefficient of 0.60. Figure 3 further illustrates the distinct
differences between the three groups included in the study.
Conclusion
This study investigates the operational and financial
efficiencies of selected privatized airports in the United
Kingdom, selected public airports in the United States, and
Figure 1. Technical efficiency index results.
Figure 2. Financial efficiency index.
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selected airports in Latin America. The main objective of
this paper is to analyze and measure the performance of
several different groups of airports, categorized based upon
degree of private involvement in airport operations. One
should bear in mind that productivity is influenced by
government regulation, airport-airline usage agreements,
work methods, capital, quality, technology, weather con-
ditions, and position of runways.
Based on the endogenous-weighted TFP model used to
measure technical and operational efficiency, US airports
outperformed those airports within the UK and LA groups.
There was a similar outcome in terms of the financial
efficiency index, except that the LA group outperformed
the UK group in five of the years during the study period.
However, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest a trend
between private involvement and airport performance.
Many studies suggest that the debate on public versus
private airports cannot be empirically decided, and that
economic and political factors need to be considered in
each case. Privatization is not a panacea to resolve the
problems of poorly managed public entities. Airports are
monopolistic, or at best oligopolistic, in character and as
such, transfer of ownership from a public monopoly to a
private monopoly may not guarantee higher productivity
and efficiency. Airport privatization, in several cases, had a
negative effect on the industry as the newly created
monopolies have taken advantage of their dominant
position.
The productivity and efficiency of airports depend on the
market power, regulatory control, and competitive condi-
tions in which the airports operate. Promoting a competi-
tive environment or enacting a proper regulatory regime
yields substantial benefits. As mentioned before, the sheer
size of an airport may have a strong effect on the nature of
efficiency due to synergies and economies of scale. Clearly,
further empirical studies are required to assess the
relationship between ownership structure and productivity
at commercial airports.
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